The
Chris. F. Masse 2004 Year-End Awards — Prediction
Markets & Decision Markets — by Chris. F.
Masse — 2004-12-31 — [NEW: The
Chris. F. Masse 2005 Awards]
2.Biggest
Loser of 2004:NewsFutures
— This
play-money exchange had mixed feelings
preceding the 2004 US
election
(alternatively putting Kerry or Bush ahead), and predicted John Kerry
on the election day's early morning. It has an omelet on its face.
[On January 27th, 2005, Dr. Emile Servan-Schreiber, CEO of
NewsFutures,
posted a 6-page rebuttal
that details his viewpoint on this controversial issue. - PDF]
3.Best Scholar of
2004:
Prof. Paul
W. Rhode and Prof. Koleman
S. Strumpf, for their discussion on market efficiency in
their paper, Historical
Prediction Markets: Wagering
on Presidential Elections. - (2004's PDF
- 2003's PDF,
which is a longer paper)
Quote: "The
IEM continued its track record of predicting election vote-share,
predicting Bush's victory within 1.1 percent of the actual outcome. At
midnight on Nov. 1, the IEM's vote share market had Bush earning
50.45 percent of the popular vote, compared to 49.55 percent for Kerry."
Quote: "The IEM's winner-take-all market,
where prices reflect the probability
of each candidate's winning the election, predicted a close race. On
Nov. 1, traders gave Bush a 51.4 percent chance of winning, compared to
a 48.6 percent chance for Kerry."
7.Most
Charismatic: This award is
shared between...
11.Best
Comeback of 2004: The
Yasser Arafat Termination contract on TradeSports/InTrade
[following news of his hospitalization, and which otherwise hadn't
attracted much excitement and conviction among the traders].
13.Most
Stagnant Thinker of 2004:
Lawmakers around the world (but in Ireland
and Great Britain) who ban
prediction markets on the ground that it amounts to online gambling.
15.Enough
Already!:
The Iowa
Electronic Markets as the leading
political futures exchange. Hell no! The stenographers of the American
Press should now focus on the Irish
exchange, TradeSports/InTrade.
17.Person
of the Year 2004:Prof.
Robin Hanson — Fortune's Geoffrey Colvin wrote that
business persons should listen
to
the people who got the [2004 US] election right. Well, if
there's
one man who has a lot to
say, it's Robin Hanson, a professor now with tenure at George
Mason University. In his own words:
"I was the first to publish
proposals to widely apply speculative markets to better aggregate
information for science and policy, to subsidize them via automated
market makers, and to lower judging cost via audit lotteries" (PDF).
As
everybody knows, Prof.
Robin Hanson is a prediction markets co-inventor
(circa the fall of 1988) and the main
economist behind the 2000–2003 US DoD's DARPA's IAO's FutureMAP / Policy
Analysis Market
project (PDF). Today's real-money
prediction
exchanges
have been benefiting indirectly from his pioneering studies, and in
return, their blatant success in foretelling the 2004 US election
validates his main thesis (i.e., idea futures
markets
will do
good to
our global civilization), helps
pulling its far-fetched extensions
(e.g.,
democracies
should be
governed by conditional prediction markets) out
of the closet, and makes his
technology (the combinatorial information market - PDF) a hot forecasting
tool for private and
public decision-makers.
18.Destined for Stardom:HedgeStreet
— [2005-04-18: HedgeStreet
Interview -
Interview with Russell Andersson, VP Instrument Originator and
Co-Founder of HedgeStreet, and Ursula Burger, VP Corporate Marketing
and Co-Founder of HedgeStreet.]
19.Destined
for Oblivion:NewsFutures'
public, play-money markets.
— [Note that I
say nothing about their corporate
markets.]
20.Best Theater of 2004:
The
US political
futures markets.
21.Worst Theater of 2004:
The
seven-hour Kerry presidency sending the Bush futures contract down to
30% at 5 p.m. on election day. Argh!... Nom de
Dieu!!... See this
Bloomberg graph:
22.Worst Scandal of 2004:
This award is
shared
between...
Blaming BetFair
for
turpitudes that pre-existed in a rotten environment (the horse race
betting markets) and that only an electronic betting exchange can
uncover.
Forbidding jockeys and horse owners to hedge
against their possible defeats. Why preventing financial innovation in
sports?
23.Most Under-Reported Story of 2004:
Hey,
folks, VC-backed Californian HedgeStreet
managed to get CFTC approval to set up a Web-based prediction exchange
listing contracts
that have a "legitimate economic purpose", with no requirement to set
up a
physical pit, thus disproving long-time CFTC-critic
Robin
Hanson, and all this up against the lobbying effort of both the
CBoT and the CME, which both opposed
strongly this
new contender.
California rules!
24.Most Over-Reported Story of 2004:
"The
orange-juice futures market
is better at
predicting the weather in Florida than the Weather Service."
Come on!...
It was just a one-shot study, published 20 years ago. (Reference below.)
25.Best Dollar Spent:
On the Bush
futures contract(s), of course! —
[on
either TradeSports/InTrade
or BetFair,
which also traded
political futures markets,
albeit less sophisticated and 3 times less popular than InTrade's ones.]
27.Boldest Tactic of 2004:
That unnamed
speculator with political motives who aimed at exploiting the
narrowness of the InTrade
Bush/Kerry futures markets. It failed miserably, granted, but it was
damn bold.
28.Best Idea of 2004:
Professors
Justin Wolfers and Eric
Zitzewitz "persuaded
TradeSports to run experimental contingent betting
markets, in which one bets on whether President Bush will be
re-elected, conditional on other specified events occurring. Early
results suggest that market participants strongly believe that Osama
bin Laden’s capture would have a substantial effect on
President
Bush’s electoral fortunes, and interestingly that the chance
of
his capture peaks just before the election." This clever idea proves,
once
again, as I have said from day one, that bet constitutions should be
externalized to scholars.
29.Worst Idea of 2004:
Running
conditional prediction
markets under standard technology (CDA), and not implementing a
combinatorial information aggregation technology. When Rummy said, "You
go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish
to have at a later time", even
Republicans agreed that it was not his best line. Let's build a better
tool before we address formidable challenges.
30.Sorry to See You Go:
The
betting on
the U.S. Homeland Security Advisory
System, at TradeSports/InTrade.
Why these
interesting markets (which quantified at +20% the so-calledOctober
surprise) were faded out, I cannot for the life of me
understand.
31.Fifteen Minutes of Fame:
This award
is
shared between...
Prof. Charles F.
Manski, for his paper Interpreting
the
Predictions of Prediction
Markets - (PDF
- PDF mirror);
Barry Ritholtz, for
his ranting
and raving
about political prediction markets.
33.Best Spin of 2004:
Trade
Exchange Network Group CEO John
Delaney persuading
stenographer Dick O'Brien that his Ireland-based company might have
played a role in the 2000–2003 US DoD's DARPA's IAO's
FutureMAP / Policy
Analysis Market program. - (PDF
mirror)
34.Most
Under-Rated: Judiciary
bets (Martha Stewart, Michael Jackson, Kobe Bryant, SCO versus IBM,
etc.), on TradeSports/InTrade
or elsewhere.
They are the
quintessence of the prediction markets ("subjective
judgments by
established judges can be used to settle bets" wrote Prof.
Robin
Hanson). The Martha Stewart futures market showed sustained long-term
predictive power (see this
InTrade graph, pictured below), albeit with a peak reflecting
punctual doubt and undecidedness some time just before the announcement
of the sentence. [Martha
got only
5
months behind bars, so this InTrade market was indeed
predictive.] InTrade -
Martha Stewart to Be
Sentenced 14 months or More
35.Most Over-Rated:
Sports
predictions
(e.g., the Red Sox
curse),
because of the bias that
otherwise-rational traders are stuck with. Fore more on this, read the
Paul
C. Tetlock
paper - (PDF).
And see this
InTrade graph: TradeSports
- Boston Red Sox to Win 2004
World Series
36.Macro-Prediction:
In the future, more CFTC-approved,
Web-based, non-intermediated exchanges
(designed as contract makers and
registered as derivatives clearing organizations) are going to trade
European-style, binary option contracts that do not have underlying
cash
markets. As their primary purpose should officially be hedging, these
exchanges will list only contracts that have a "legitimate economic
purpose". It is easy to forecast that these hedging-purposed markets
are going
to show predictive power.
Question: Is my analysis dominantly correct or dominantly
incorrect? I ask you, the pajamas bloggers. Please, be prepared to discuss this on your own
blog. I will later on update this webpage with links to your best takes.
2005-01-09:
Google alerted me
only this Sunday, January 9th, 2005, about CommerceNet Labs associate
Chris Hibbert's zMarket.
-
(Here's a December 2004's PDF,
which kind of shows that Chris Hibbert is Robin Hanson-compatible.)
- It missed the mark for the year 2004, but could be a strong candidate
for
2005. Stay tuned! - [2005-03-12:
Commerce.Net's
Chris Hibbert has published, on
Wednesday, March 09, 2005, a report about Zocalo, an open-source
software
platform for deploying prediction markets - (PDF).]
2005-01-10:
I realize that not
including Dr. Robert
W. Hahn
in my list was an injustice. His entry in the field in 2004
marked the arrival of a new kind of scholar. Here come the politically
connected scholars, joining the fray. Dr. Robert
W. Hahn is the executive director of the AEI-Brookings
think tank, a
bipartisan joint venture between NeoCon
Central (Pat Buchanan's lingo for Newt Gingrich's American
Enterprise Institute) and the famous, (centrist?liberal?),
respected institute.
Robert
Hahn said that AEI-Brookings
aims at being a
source of
information all sides "can really trust". (The New York Times,
1998-07-30) - His latest paper
on prediction markets is: A
New Approach for
Regulating Information
Markets - (PDF)
- by Robert
W. Hahn
and Paul C. Tetlock - December
2004.
2005-01-11:
In my 2004 awards
list, I was tough on a play-money
exchange (NewsFutures)
who got
the 2004 US presidential
election dead wrong. I
believe
that if you are in the "predicting the future" industry, you have to be
held accountable. The political
prediction markets was, at inception
(IEM), has been and always will be the killer application of the field.
Either you pass this litmus test, and you're in the field, or you fail
it, and you're out. However, to have a more balance view of the
predictive power of play-money exchanges, you can't leave this webpage
without reading this excellent paper:
2005-01-17:
Among those
nominated for the "Bummest Rap of 2004" was Jim Wolf, director of the
Indiana University Public Opinion Laboratory, for his definitive and
premonitory assessment that a
political futures market "would be laughed right off the podium" at a
scientific conference. "There really is no scientific ground for saying
that
this kind of approach is a legitimate or let alone a better measure", Wolf
said.
Well, let's wish the participants of the
upcoming
DIMACS prediction markets conference will have a good
laugh... at
him.
2005-01-30:
I've read with
great interest Servan-Schreiber's rebuttal (PDF),
but I still stand for what I said. Over its
lifetime, the NewsFutures
Bush/Kerry
contract generated contradictory predictions (as you can see clearly in
the first graph presented on Servan-Schreiber's
document, which shows the contact over and then below and then over and
finally below the 50% line), and
foresaw Kerry for president on election day's early morning (48% at
9:43 AM ET). By
contrast, over its
lifetime, the InTrade Bush/Kerry
contract did persistently predict Bush, and still foresaw Bush on
election day's early morning (55.3% at 8:33
AM ET). The BetFair
Republican/Democrat contract also fared well (55.9% at 8:30 AM ET).
Thus, kudos
to InTrade and BetFair, which were able to predict this close election.
2005-02-16:
In an e-mail reply
to me, blogger David
Schneider-Joseph
complained
that I was unfair to Thomas Rietz because "in the first case, Rietz was
referring to the winner-take-all market;
and in the second case, he was referring to the vote-share
market". Not true. To make things clearer, I've expanded the quotes of
his Press release. (Thanks anyway for your comment.)
2005-03-05:
This quote relates
to the
"best idea of 2004 award":
"A few months ago, when I was fed up by the portraits of
Iraq
being
painted by both the politicians and the media, it occurred to me that
we needed some sort of 'progress in Iraq' future. I suggested this to
Justin Wolfers, an expert on prediction markets at Stanford's business
school, who in turn mentioned it to someone he knows at TradeSports,
and IRAQ.TRANSFER.30JUN was born. It pays $10 if the coalition turns
over sovereignty on schedule. Otherwise it expires worthless." - Sam
Savage,
Predictive Power, San Jose Mercury
News, May 30, 2004 - (mirror
- mirror)
2005-03-07:
Interesting
exchange between NewsFutures'
Emile Servan-Schreiber and Stanford U. professor Eric Zitzewitz
on
the WashPost
site (mirror),
circa July 31, 2003:
Emile
Servan-Schreiber: "There
seems to be an underlying assumption in all
this that it's important that the exchange be based on real money.
However, many articles, including one published in SCIENCE in 2001,
have pointed out the fact that even 'virtual money' exchanges like the Hollywood
Stock Exchange and the Foresight
Exchange are remarkably
accurate in their predictions. My own experience as a long-time
operator of NewsFutures.com
(more than
26,000 markets created over 3 years, on all kinds of subjects) is that
virtual money markets such as ours are indeed very accurate, and
definitely more accurate than classic polls. Beyond material
incentives, the essential factor in getting good informational value
out of a market seems to be the knowledge that the traders bring to the
negotiation table. Are you aware of any data that would back-up the
idea that real-money actually makes a difference, or is it just a
hunch?"
Eric
Zitzewitz: "OK, I've
been fielding some tough questions, so here's
one in return. I was on NewsFutures
yesterday, and your market has
Bush's reelection
at about 50%. TradeSports.com,
a real money market, and most bookmakers
have it at 66% or so. If your market were a real money market, there
would be an arbitrage opportunity (and from what I know about TradeSports, plenty of
people ready to jump on it for sport as well as
for profit). So your price would be driven to whatever the prevailing
level was. But that isn't happening. 50% vs. 66% is a big difference,
and my guess is that most people would
think that 66% was closer to the truth. So doesn't that one datapoint
suggest that having real money at stake helps you get better prices?"
2005-03-15:
This relates to the
"most original thinker of 2004 award": What
is a dynamic pari-mutuel
market (DPM)? (Excerpted from The
Tech Buzz
Game. Click on "Tell
Me More".)
- (PPT)
"A dynamic pari-mutuel market is a new (patent pending)
auction
mechanism, invented at Yahoo! Research Labs. The mechanism has many
nice properties. The best way to understand it is in comparison to more
familiar types of auctions. These
include the pari-mutuel auction
(often used in horse race wagering) and the continuous double auction
(used in the stock market). Pari-mutuels allow anyone to buy at
any
time (infinite liquidity), but offer no reward to participants who know
information ahead of other people. That is, pari-mutuels are
inefficient at propagating information in real time. Double auctions
efficiently propagate information, but often require a market maker to
assume risk in order to drive liquidity."
"The dynamic pari-mutuel
auction
offers
the best of both worlds.
It is
infinitely liquid (traders can buy or sell at any time); it does not
require a market maker to take on risk; it rewards participants who
know things before others do; and it efficiently aggregates and
propagates information."
B.K. Marcus:
"The
arbitrage issue requires a bit more explanation. The first time I
looked at TradeSports.com
—an
Irish sports gambling site that
operates through an international exchange of contingent
contracts—
they were putting the chances of President Bush's re-election at 60%
(i.e., a $100 BUSH WINS contract was priced at $60). The clients of TradeSports.com
spend real money on real contracts, taking
real risks
in pursuit of real reward. The virtual prediction market site, NewsFutures.com,
also offers contingent contracts on
President Bush's
re-election chances, but both purchases and pay-offs are done with play
money. Their 'market' gave Bush only a 49% chance of re-election. This
was in the spring of 2004. One obvious empirical test would be
to
compare how close the different sites come to predicting the actual
election results —will
the local knowledge of the local American
website outperform the profit-driven predictions of the international
gamblers? As I write this, in the summer of 2004, I can't yet know.
What I do know is that an 11-point
discrepancy in contract prices
couldn't last if both markets were based on the risk of real money.
If
both markets really paid a hundred dollars for their $100 contracts
—and
if they were both active enough to allow a large number of such
contracts to be traded—
then arbitrageurs could guarantee a certain
return in November. By buying the cheaper contract in each market
—the
$40 BUSH LOSES in one market and the $49 BUSH WINS contract in the
other—
they could guarantee a $100 pay-off for an $89 expenditure
(ignoring transaction costs). Note that the arbitrageur doesn't need to
have any opinion of Bush's re-election chances: he is, after all,
betting both ways. All that is necessary for the arbitrage profit
opportunity is a disagreement between the two markets: a discrepancy in
their prices. The very activity of
arbitrage would, of course, drive
the two markets toward a common price: by raising the demand for the
cheaper contracts, arbitrage would drive up the price of each, until
the discrepancy is eliminated. As long as the discrepancy remains, the
arbitrage opportunity will remain."
Emile
Servan-Schreiber: "As a
founder of the 'play-money' prediction market NewsFutures.com,
I am of
course keenly interested in the issue of prediction accuracy, and in
particular in how it compares to that of 'real-money' markets. Marcus'
article provides illuminating historical context for this issue. He
argues that markets based on real money are likely to yield better
predictions than play-money markets. It's the classic hunch that
markets work because participants must put their money where their
mouth is. As an example, he points to the significant price difference
on NewsFutures
(play-money)
and TradeSports
(real-money)
regarding the
Bush re-election contracts, and wishes for an experiment that would
help decide which is more accurate... It turns out that we recently
performed just such experiment. Together with economists Justin Wolfers
(of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania) and David Pennock
(Yahoo! Research Laboratories), we systematically compared the Football
game predictions of NewsFutures
and TradeSports
throughout
the entire
2003-2004 NFL season. Overall, both markets were highly accurate,
especially compared to individual 'experts'. But we found no systematic
accuracy advantage whatsoever for real-money predictions over
play-money predictions. In fact, NewsFutures
just edged out TradeSports
in a prediction competition. This research will shortly be published in
the forthcoming issue of Electronic Markets, 14-3 (Fall 2004), in an
article entitled: Prediction
Markets: Does Money Matter?
(PDF).
One
important thing to remember, and which Marcus fails to mention, is that
most play-money prediction markets, like NewsFutures and
the Hollywood
Stock Exchange, do offer some significant prizes to the most
successful
traders in addition to substantial non-monetary rewards like
peer-recognition and self-satisfaction. They only eliminate the risk of
participating, not the rewards. Our
data suggests that the reason
prediction markets work so well is not so much because participants put
their money where their mouth is, but rather because the better
informed will come out on top. This fits well with the hypothesis
(familiar to entrepreneurs) that human activity is in general
significatnly more driven by the pursuit of rewards than by the
avoidance of risk."
B.K. Marcus:
"The NewsFutures
study that
Mr. Servan-Schreiber brings to our attention
does tell us something, but what exactly does it tell us? The
statistical challenge to the Misesian thesis (or rather, to my
interpretation of that thesis and its application to the question of
prediction) offers an opportunity to apply the Austrian School's
praxeological insight: it is not that our understanding of economic law
is a hypothesis to be tested by empirical study; rather it is economic
law that helps us understand and interpret the results of such studies.
For instance, if the price of a good is raised, and we find that demand
for that good increases, this cannot be a disproof of the law of supply
and demand, but rather a reason for those who understand the law to
look for other contributing or distorting factors. If it's true that
the track records of NewsFutures
and TradeSports
are statistically
similar, that doesn't refute the claim that the pursuit of real profits
will increase the quality of prediction. What it shows us is that the
profit-and-loss market isn't yet big enough to draw the attention of
the biggest profit-seekers. People are making real money
at TradeSports.com,
but I doubt
there are many futures traders who can
make a living there yet. And I'm even more skeptical that anyone has
made a fortune in their exchange (with the worthy exception of the
entrepreneurs who created the site in the first place). As I stressed
in my original article, (a) an incentive for real research is likely to
contribute to the quality of bids for contingent contracts, and (b)
arbitrage is well-known to improve the efficiency of real markets
(where efficiency refers to the dissemination of information and the
reflection of that information in prices) and only the pursuit of real
profit will draw the attention of arbitrageurs. When I was first
contemplating this subject in the spring, I asked a professional
arbitrageur to comment on the discrepancy between prices at NewsFutures
and TradeSports.
He said
that NewsFutures
wasn't a
real market as far
as he was concerned, and that TradeSports
'probably isn't liquid enough
to put together a good arb'. Like
everyone else, arbitrageurs face
opportunity costs. Until prediction markets can offer big enough
profits to bring them into the game, they'll continue to focus their
attention on the opportunities that still exist in traditional
capitalist markets. That doesn't keep the current prediction markets
from being the best game in town."
2005-04-17:
This refers to the
"over-reported story":
"As an example of the sort of thing I'm talking about,
I've dug up this
rather nice paper from the wonderful SSRN. It's the latest
contribution to the debate on
orange juice futures as a tool for weather forecasting. Ever since
Richard Roll's widely misunderstood 1984 paper on the subject,
there's been an urban myth going
round that the frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) futures market
provides a better forecast of the weather in Florida than the weather
channel. Not only did Roll not find this, he actually thought
he'd found that the variance in the FCOJ contract price was about five
times greater than anything that could possibly be explained by weather
movements. The paper I've linked above revists the issue and is rather
more favourable to the efficient markets thesis in this regard, but for
our purposes, we only need to note two things. First, the market
doesn't care about "the
weather"; it cares about whether it’s freezing or not,
because
that’s the only thing that matters for orange production
(practical knowledge). And second, the market reacts to today's
temperature news; there's no attempt here to defend the proposition
that the futures market forecasts the weather."
2005-04-27:
This refers to the
"over-reported story":
In his presentation at Northwestern (PDF
- review),
here's how John Ledyard sums
up Richard Roll's 1984 paper: "OJ
futures improve freeze forecasts."
His presentation is as great as the
Pennock/Wellman's one of last year.
2005-05-03:
A business
columnist
wrote to me, and I would like to post here two points I made in my
answer to him:
Barry Ritholtz is a smart and courteous man. What he said
about
the prediction markets applied to the U.S. primaries were interesting,
and you know what, that's the
reason I linked to him. I wanted my
readers to discover his arguments. However, Barry
Ritholtz was awarded a Razzie because of
his conclusion, namely that "There are few, if any, predictive powers
of Political Futures Exchanges", which contradicts just every paper
published on prediction markets since the end of the eighties.
Donald Luskin is a libertarian Republican. He's a nice man.
I'm
sympathetic to most of his views (and, at occasional times, I would
disagree with him). Precisely, in the
field of prediction markets:
Donald
Luskin was the
first to
report extensively on the aberrations endured by
the Bush futures contract on TradeSports/InTrade, while
the rest
of the
Press was napping.
Donald
Luskin offered
an
hypothesis (political manipulation by a Soros-inspired
agent). Many commentators derided his interpretation. I'm still waiting
for them to come up with an alternative explanation that could be
satisfying. The jury is still out, but no witness dares to
take
the
stand. (Take this as a challenge, man!).
Presidential Reality Check - An
Assessment of NewsFutures’ 2004 US Election Prediction
Markets -
by Dr. Emile Servan-Schreiber - (PDF)
- 27 January 2005
Decision 2000 - Predicting
Elections Using Financial Markets: The Iowa Electronic Markets -
(PDF)
-
by Prof. Robert Forsythe (IEM) - (speech) - 9 February 2000
Prediction Markets - (PDF
- PDF
- PDF
mirror - PDF
mirror)
- by Justin Wolfers and Eric Zitzewitz - May 2004
"The
Yasser Arafat Termination contract on InTrade"
(my lingo) = "Y. Arafat to depart-vacate Israel & the
Palestinian
Territories" (InTrade's
lingo,
which was an implicit bet on the Sharon government ejecting the
Palestinian
leader out the Grand Israel.)
By the way, if you wondered, Palestinian leader Yasser
Arafat
died of cirrhosis of the liver. (Story)
Shall We
Vote on Values, But Bet on Beliefs? - (PDF) -
by
Robin Hanson - Introduces
the concept of futarchy - September 2003
The Policy Analysis
Market - An Electronic Commerce Application of a Combinatorial
Information Market
- (PDF)
- by Robin Hanson, Charles Polk, John Ledyard and
Takashi Ishikida - 2003
Combinatorial
Information Market Design - (PDF) -
by
Robin Hanson - January 2003
How Efficient Are
Information Markets?
Evidence from an Online Exchange - (PDF)
- by Paul C. Tetlock - January
2004
In the first version, I wrote that Tanenbaum "taught"
computer
science to Torvalds. Sorry for
the mistake. Thanks to Mike
Linksvayer for the correction.
Prof.
Tanenbaum:
"I would like to take this opportunity to thank Linus for producing
[Linux]. Before there was Linux there was MINIX, which had a
40,000-person newsgroup, most of whom were sending me email every day.
I was going crazy with the endless stream of new features people were
sending me. I kept refusing them all because I wanted to keep MINIX
small enough for my students to understand in one semester. My
consistent refusal to add all these new
features is what inspired Linus to write Linux. Both of us are
now happy with the results. The only person who is perhaps not so happy
is Bill Gates. I think this is a good thing."
Prof.
Tanenbaum:
"Linus didn't sit down in a vacuum and
suddenly type in the Linux source code. He had my book, was running
MINIX, and undoubtedly knew the history (since it is in my book). But
the code was his. The proof of this is that he messed the design up.
MINIX is a nice, modular microkernel system, with the memory manager
and file system running as user-space processes. This makes the system
cleaner and more reliable than a big monolithic kernel and easier to
debug and maintain, at a small price in performance, although even on a
4.77 MHz 8088 it booted in maybe 5 seconds (vs. a minute for Windows on
hardware 500 times faster). An example of commercially successful
microkernel is QNX. Instead of writing a new file system and a new
memory manager, which would have been easy, Linus rewrote the whole
thing as a big monolithic kernel, complete with inline assembly code
:-( . The first version of Linux was like a time machine. It went back
to a system worse than what he already had on his desk. Of course, he
was just a kid and didn't
know better (although if he had paid better attention in class he
should have), but producing a system that was fundamentally different
from the base he started with seems pretty good proof that it was a
redesign."
Speaking of Tanenbaum, please note that I'm
a
right-leaning
independent libertarian who would have voted for a Massachusetts
liberal in November 2004 in order to protest Bush 43's foreign policy
(thank God the
French have no business in picking the U.S. president!!). Thus, I
don't mind at all Tanenbaum being a liberal, because I value diversity
in the public debate.
If
you wrote a story pointing to this column, and want me to post (on this
webpage and/or on
my
referrer spot) a link to your webpage or blog entry, please
e-mail me its permanent URL. See,
I don't publish "letters to the editor" or "comments", and I don't use
blogging
software that trackbacks weblogs responding to my posts;
I
only manually link to quality
stuff that I deem of interest for my intended audience.
Disambiguation
Synonyms of "real-money prediction markets":
event
derivatives, European binary options, European call options, event-driven futures
markets, event futures markets, idea futures markets, information
futures markets, predictive market-based technology.
Inappropriate terms: event markets, idea markets, information markets, opinion
markets, predictive markets.
Sub-category: "decision markets" are
prediction markets used as decision tools.